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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PROPERTY IMPROVEMENT
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
CLEON D. TUCKER and MRS.
CLEON D. TUCKER, also
known as BETTY J. TUCKER,
his wife; WILLARD M. TUCKER
and MRS. WILLARD M. TUCKER,
also known as PHYLLIS 0.
TUCKER, his wife;

No. 142 37

Defendants and
Appellants,
EUGENE S. SIMPSON and MRS.
EUGENE S. SIMPSON, also
known as JANE DOE SIMPSON,
his wife; CONTINENTAL
ACCOUNT SERVICING HOUSE,
INC., a Utah corporation; and
KEY ACCOUNT COLLECTION HOUSE,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action on a promissory note bearing the
names of the Defendants-Appellants and others.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff filed its complaint based upon a promissory note bearing the names of the Defendants-Appellants and
others.

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to all

defendants was granted as to the individual defendants but
denied as to the corporate defendants whose cases are still
pending before the trial court,

Defendants-Appellants have

appealed the lower court's order of summary judgment against
them.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants-Appellants Tucker (hereinafter referred
to as "Defendants Tucker") and others executed a promissory
note to Plaintiff-Respondent (hereinafter referred to as
"Plaintiff") on March 26, 1974, in the amount of $150,000.00,
part of the proceeds therefrom being received by the Defendants
Simpson, as agreed, for their own benefit and part of the
proceeds being received, as agreed, by agents of the Defendants
Simpson as their broker's commission for the transaction.

The

promissory note was executed for the purpose of facilitating
a sale of certain stock and other interests in Continental
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Account Servicing House, Inc., and Key Account Collection
House, Inc., both party defendants in this action but not
participating in this appeal.

The seller in this transaction

was Eugene S. Simpson and the buyers were Mr. and Mrs. Cleon
D. Tucker and Mr. and Mrs. Willard M. Tucker, all named defendants.
As partial security for the promissory note, the
Defendants Tucker were required to and did place into Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., certain real properties
valued in excess of $1,000,000.00.

As additional security,

the Defendants Simpson were required to and did place into
escrow certain stock of the Defendant corporations, constituting
controlling interest therein.

However, on or about June 17,

'1974, the Defendants Tucker removed the real properties from
the said corporation, allegedly because they believed themselves to have been defrauded by the Defendants Simpson.
As a result of the transfer of that real property
out of the corporation, the terms of both the promissory note
and the contract of sale were breached and Plaintifffs security
on the note was seriously jeopardized.

Plaintiff brought this

action for judgment on the promissory note.

After pleadings

were filed by all parties, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as against the individual defendants, but inasmuch
as the court felt the corporate defendants had pled certain

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 4 -

defenses which established issues of material fact, judgment
was denied as against the corporate defendants (R.101).
It was 6 days later that the escrow agent holding
the stock as security voluntarily deposited said stock with
the court for disposition as the court deemed proper (R.131A).
Some six days after that the Defendants Tucker moved the
court to vacate its judgment (R.105, 111), which motion was
duly considered by the court and denied (R.130).
•

Some 77 days after the Defendants Tucker had filed

their answer to Plaintiff's amended complaint (R.51) and 2 3
days after the court entered judgment against them (R.96),
Defendants Tucker sought to file an amended answer to amended
complaint (R.115) without leave of court or opposing counsel.
This is significant for it is the first point in the pleadings
wherein Defendants Tucker raise the issue of an "offset" purportedly owing to them (R.120, Fourth Affirmative Defense).
Also significant is the fact that on August 8, 1975,
Plaintiff received a letter from Defendants Simpson advising
Plaintiff that when the Tuckers unlawfully took their real
property and abandoned the corporation, the Defendants Simpson
intentionally issued additional stock, thereby destroying the
value of the stock held as security.
Defendants Tucker have appealed the trial court's
decision.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WERE NO DISPUTED
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT CONTAINED IN ITS
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Defendants Tucker have raised two major issues as
purportedly being disputed issues of material fact.

The first

issue concerns an offset which the Defendants Tucker claim is
owing to them.

However, such alleged offset was never pled

before the court nor did the court ever make a holding concerning any such offset.

The second issue is the matter of

attorney's fees.
Even a cursory examination of the court's amended
order granting summary judgment in part (R.101), however,
will disclose that the matter of attorney's fees was neither
included in the judgment nor decided, but was, rather, reserved
for future hearings.

Both of these matters will be discussed

in more detail immediately following.
A.

There is no disputed issue of material fact
concerning an offset purportedly owing to
Defendants Tucker since such was never
alleged in the pleadings before the court.
Defendants Tucker first introduced their claim to

an "offset" in their amended answer to amended complaint,
Fourth Affirmative Defense (R.120).

This- is also the only

portion of the record where they claim an offset.
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This amended answer was ignored by the trial court,
and rightly so for several reasons*
First, the amended answer was filed on August 20,
1975, 2 3 days after the court entered its order granting
summary judgment in part (R.96), and 20 days after the
court entered its amended order granting summary judgment
in part (R.101).

In other words, the issue of an offset was

first raised by the Defendants Tucker after the case had been
fully adjudicated as to them.

This is simply not the proper

and timely way to raise an issue.

Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P..

At 4A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, §1207 (1957), this fundamental
point of logic is inscribed.

"A matter will not be considered

by the appellate court although it may appear in the record
if it is not properly there."
Second, the amended answer was filed 77 days after
the filing of the answer and without leave of either the
court or opposing counsel as required by Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P.
Not only was it filed far too late for consideration but also
it was never properly before the trial court.

Such being the

case, the amended answer must be stricken from the record.
Third, even if the trial court could have considered
the issue of offset -- which, of course, was physically impossible
due to the chronological sequence of the filing of the amended
answer -- it was never raised by sworn affidavit as is required
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by Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.

The affidavit of Willard M. Tucker

(R.86) states at Paragraph 6 simply that the Tuckers never
received any of the proceeds of the loan.

There was absolutely

no allegation that an offset was owing or even an allegation
that the Defendants Tucker should have received some of the
loan proceeds.

in fact, there was no legal or contractual

requirement that the Tuckers receive any of the proceeds of
the loan, which, logically, were to be paid to the seller
and to seller's brokers, and the Tuckers simply were not
included in that group.

Such being the case, they cannot

now attempt to raise an issue before the appellate court
which was not before the trial court.

4 C.J.S., Appeal and

Error, §243 (1957) .
Defendants Tucker have alleged that the issue of
"offset" was raised by the court in its minute entry prior
to the entry of the judgment.

However, the minute entry

cannot be considered under well—established principles of
law.

The court's formal written judgment supersedes all

previous statements as to the court's intentions.

This

included previbus oral arguments (Newton v. State Road
Commission, 23 Ut.2d 350, 463 P.2d 565, 567 (1970)) and also,
more importantly, previous written statements (Cook v. Gardner,
14 Ut.2d 197, 381 P.2d 78 (1963)).
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The Cook case, supra, is perhaps the most definitive
statement on the matter.

There the court upheld the formal

judgment of the trial court which differed, from the minute
entry, by holding that ". . .of controlling importance is
the fact that the minute entry is superseded by the document
signed by the judge which becomes the order of the court. . . ."
Id. 80.

The minute entry could not possibly be construed as

the judgment of the trial court because it is insufficient to
act as a judgment under Rule 58(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure where it is stated that "all judgments shall be signed
by the judge and filed with the clerk."

The court's minute

entry in this case is both unsigned and superseded by the formal
judgment.
In Osborne v. Osborne, 60 Wash. 2d 163, 372 P.2d 538
(1962), that court explained the significance of a minute entry.
"But an unsigned minute entry is not a
judgment. As was said in State ex rel
Thomas v. Lawler, 23 Wash.2d 87, 159
P.2d 622, p. minute entry made by the
clerk of the court has nothing to do
with the final judgment of the court.
It is merely evidence of what the judge
has decided to do at the time. He is
free to change his decision at any time
before the entry of his final order or
judgment. If the minute entry is different from the judgment entered, it cannot
be used for the purpose of contradicting
or impeaching the judgment." Id. 541.
(Emphasis added.)
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In addition, it must be considered that in the
present case the trial court had full opportunity to reconsider its minute entry and its order when it signed its amended
order of summary judgment and when it heard and denied Defendants'
motion to correct amended order (R.105) and Defendants' motion
for order vacating judgment (R.lll).

Even after having con-

sidered the matter on four distinct occasions, the trial court
refused to disturb its formal order of summary judgment.
This is the law not only in Utah but also in almost
all jurisdictions.

46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §153 (1969)

states:
"The records of the judgment should be
distinguished from the judge's minutes
which are merely memoranda which the
judge makes upon his own docket, for his
own convenience, to enable him to see
that the clerk accurately makes up the
record."
In Pierce County v. Thurston County, 13 Wash.App. 602,
536 P.2d 3 (1975), a most recent decision, the court held:
"Whatever a trial court may assert in an oral or memorandum
decision has no binding effect unless it is incorporated in
its formal findings or conclusions."

jcd. 4.

The minute entry was not the court's judgment nor
was it a pleading.

It should not be considered part of the

record of the court but purely as an informal note evidencing
what the court was thinking at the time.

Such being the case,

then, it canhdt be considered on appeal.
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In Southern Pacific Transportation Company v. Lueck,
11 Ariz. 560, 535 P.2d 599 (1975), that court held under its
Rule 75(h) (which is similar to Rule 75(h), U.R.C.P.) that
it would follow ". . .the general rule of wide application
that an appellate court can determine a cause only upon the
record of the court below."

JEd. 614.

The Utah decision of

Williams v. Tuckett, 98 Ut.398, 95 P.2d 982 (1939), follows
the same rule.

This case is particularly relevant to the

point that a minute entry cannot be considered on appeal
for any purpose whatsoever.
"We are of the opinion that there is
nothing for us on appeal. An appeal
may not be taken from a minute entry,
but must be taken from a judgment entered
upon the order evidenced in the minute
entry." Id. 982.
See also Omega Investment Company v. Woolley, 75 Ut. 274,
284 P. 523 (1930).
The matter of an offset is not a disputed issue
of material fact for the simple reason that it was neither
properly alleged in the pleadings before the court nor ever
mentioned in any of the court's orders.
arises in Appellants1 Brief.

The first mention

The rule is firmly established

that if a matter was not raised before the trial court it cannot be raised on appeal.
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B.

There is a disputed issue of material
fact concerning attorney fees, but
this is irrelevant to the appeal since
the trial court reserved the matter
for future hearings.
The trial court's reservation of the matter of

attorney fees i intil a future hearing had the effect of denying the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to attorney
fees*
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POINT II
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT
AND PROPER AND WAS FULLY WITHIN ITS POWER
AND AUTHORITY.
The Defendants Tucker claim in their brief that
the trial court grossly exceeded its power and authority by
granting summary judgment to the Plaintiff.

They have taken

issue with the trial court's judgment on three major points,
each of which is discussed immediately following.
A.

The trial court is limited in its decision
neither by the pleadings of Plaintiff nor
by the terms of the breached agreement.
Particularly in the present case, the trial court

was not restricted in the relief it could afford the Plaintiff
by Plaintiff's prayer for specific relief.

This is the well-

settled rule and is stated at 49 C.J.S., Judgments, §49 (1947).
"In contested cases, or cases in which an
answer has been filed, the relief which
may be granted is not limited to that demanded in the complaint or specifically
prayed for, particularly under statutes
in effect so providing; the court may
grant any relief which is consistent with
the case made by the pleadings and proof
and embraced within the issues." Id. 113.
The same section further states that when there are claims for
both general and specific relief, the court's alternatives are
not limited by the request for specific relief.
"Where a prayer for general relief is added
to the demand of specific relief, the court
is not limited to the specific demand, but
may grant, particularly under code practice,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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such, other appropriate relief as may
be consistent witli the allegations and
proofs and necessary to adjust fully
the equities of the case,
" Id. ] ] 4.
Such „i s the situation in the present case.

Plaintiff's

amended complaint contains a demand for specific relief (I-.39,
ff ] - 3) ai id a d e m a n d for g e n e r a l r e l i e f
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T h e Utah,

courts are in agreement with the general rule which allows
the trial court to grant relief as it chooses,,
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Singleton, 63 I Jt. 283, 225 P. 8„] (1,924)., this court: held:
"It may also be the case that, where both
specific and general relief are prayed for,
as in this case, the court may not follow
the prayer for specific relief, but may
grant general relief. Such seems to have
been the course pursued in the case at bar.
The objection, therefore, that the relief
granted by the court, was broader than the
specific relief prayed for, i s not tenabl e."
Id. 8 2 .
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open to the Plaintiff under the contract.

Defendants Tucker

have accomplished this by being the initial parties to breach
the contract by their withdrawal from the corporation of the
real properties they had placed therein as security for the
promissory note, thereby withdrawing the real properties
from the terms of the agreement.

Next, the Defendants Tucker

completely abandoned the corporation to the Simpsons, thereby
allowing the Simpsons to destroy completely the value of the
stock held as security by issuing new stock which destroyed
the controlling interest once held as collateral.
It is fundamental to the doctrine that a court
may determine matters on the basis of public policy that
a party should not be allowed to destroy completely all of
the security in a contractual agreement and then require the
injured party to look only to that security for relief.

By

their own conduct the Defendants Tucker have come into this
court without "clean hands" and are estopped from claiming
that the Plaintiff can look only to the security outlined in
the terms of the agreement.

27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, §136 (1966) .

The Defendants Tucker were the parties initially in
breach of the contract and did everything within their power to
destroy the collateral held for Plaintiff.

They cannot now

demand that this court restrict Plaintiff's remedy solely to
acquisition of the now worthless stock.

The trial court's

decision was most certainly not limited by the terms of the
breached agreement.
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B.

The trial court was fully empowered to
enter a personal judgment against the
Defendants and to provide that the
security held by the court should be
sold t:o satisfy such judgment.
Defendants Tucker have at.tacked the actions of the
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*" However, Oofonciants Tuck* r

have ripparcnt Iv over, uoked the fact tl lat for the past: 3 0 years :
that statute and the Utah case fo] lowi i ig it have been stricken
I 3 .

Kir che
expressly
pit [^ •

past 10 years §§78-37-1 and 78-37-2 hive

uvl purposely omitted any reference
",a

•

' .*

•he present case,

i i iclude tl: le s t o c k

+

o personal

<_ : - .:
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See §78-37- ] , I J.C.A. (n. 1 975 supp.).

The Legislature's removal of personal property foreclosure
actioi is from the purview of these statutes can on! ^ be interpreted as a legislative determination that the provisions of
• -

..* ifu'-es shall definitely exclude

person*;! property.

actions

dealing with

^he reason for this is that in that same

year the Utah Legislature adopted the Uniform Commercial Code
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and superseding
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"History").

Simply stated, the law relied upon by Defendants

Tucker was repealed 10 years ago.

See also Hubbs vs. Warehouse

Service Commission, infra.
When the courts are dealing with security interests
and chattel mortgages, the scope of their authority is quite
broad.

It is stated at 15 Am.Jur.2d, Chattel Mortgages, §233

(1964):
"When a court exercising equitable powers
acquires jurisdiction of a suit to foreclose
a chattel mortgage, it has the right to
decide all matters involved in the suit. . . .
Moreover, the court has inherent power to
make supplemental orders affecting the
details of the performance of its decree."
(Emphasis added.)

• .

Concerning the performance of its decree, the case
of Betty v. Tuer, 292 S.W. 271 (Tex.Civ.App., 1927) is instructive.
In that case the court exercised the broad scope of its power
to decree an order concerning a promissory note and foreclosure
of a chattel mortgage by ordering that the plaintiff could
execute on the mortgaged truck or any other property of the
Defendant.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
In the present case the court entered a personal

judgment against the Defendants Tucker in the amount of $151,878.75
plus $52.10 court costs.

Ordinarily, it would probably be most

appropriate for the Plaintiff to seek to levy on whatever of
Defendants1 property that it wished.

Owing, however, to the

unusual circumstances of this case wherein the escrow agent
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In Lassen v. Curtis, 40 Wash.2d 82, 241 p.2d 210
(1952), the court held under a statute similar in its alternatives to our Uniform Commercial Code that a personal judgment
for the balance due would be entered along with a decree of
foreclosure on the personal property held as security.

It is

important to note that the court neither objected to nor
noted as unusual the fact that the trial court's judgment
both foreclosed the chattel mortgage and awarded a personal
judgment.
"Since they [plaintiffs] held, in the
form of a promissory note, a separate
obligation for the sum due, appellants
asked for and received in addition to
a decree of foreclosure a personal judgment for the balance due upon the note.
This was in accordance with the provisions
of the. . .statute." Id. 211-12.(Emphasis
added.)
In Hubbs v. Warehouse Service Commission, 149 Ore.
559, 42 P.2d 180 (1935), the plaintiff sued for both a personal
judgment against the defendants and for an order allowing the
sale of the personal property held as security.

The trial

court so ordered and its decision was affirmed on appeal.

:

"Upon the trial a judgment was entered in
favor of plaintiff for the full amount
of the principal of the notes with unpaid
interest, attorney's fees, and costs, and
a decree for the foreclosure of the mortgage and sale of the mortgaged property was
likewise entered." Id. 181.
The court then went on to state that it even foresaw

a duty of the trial court to enter both a personal judgment and
a decree of foreclosure.
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"The subject of the mortgage in the
instant case was personal and not real
property. In addition to the mortgage,
notes were given evidencing the indebtedness and it became the duty of the court
in the. foreclosure proceedings to enter
judgment against the defendants for the
full amount due on the notes. . . .
Section 6-505 Oregon Code (1930), relied
upon by defendants, applies c ily to siiits
for the foreclosure of mortn-< <>s on real
property and hence h a s no beaming here."
Id. 1R4.
Tins i *; particularly relevant to
f

* '

-

i

he case at bar

' t, j;efoiuiants Tucker h a v e - • .;i • :. ; -u ,]_.-•

a sratutc which applies only to t h e foreclosure of real estate
mortgages

f§7b-j7-x, U.^.^., sup3 -\j and i s , therefore,

irrelevant.

..

..•

,

The i riiform Commercial r o d e ,
v-"o i \*> \ - - *•-,( i r .
incnf

is mvoj\,x>d.

porsona I mnn^y
SLr;i.t:'.;

i I v, [ <-1

.

idopted b y Ut. ah ui 1985,

i-.-M w (\ . ( <; </i,^ro ,» soci,: . tv aoroe-

These remedies include decrees of foreclosure,

judgments, cxonit imiq and ^if ] i ke.

• :-J 1 i -• -'' J t •• • J v - i ,
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It has been

_!.(' C u m u l a t i v e

Jf;vi

that "i party need not: elect one or the other.
"Generally, the remedies provided under
Article IX are cumulative, and a party
may sue on a debt secured b y the security
agreement without waiving his security
interest." Boyce, The Uniform Commercial
Code in Utah, 3] Utah L.Rev. 70 (1 9 6 6 ) .
Sec t i on 7 0 A- 9 - 5 01 (5) , U. C . A. , make s it e L <. -* r in a t
after a plaintiff has obtained a mor ley

ad.'imc.-r.:

\;: * . .\.*r

defendant, if may proceed to execute or foreclose upon
collateral, as was done in the present case.
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"When a secured party has reduced his
claim to judgment the lien of any levy
which may be made upon his collateral
by virtue of any execution based upon
the judgment shall relate back to the
date of the perfection of the security
interest in such collateral, A judicial
sale, pursuant to such execution, is a
foreclosure of the security interest by
judicial procedure within the meaning
of this section. . . . "
§70A-9-501(l) illustrates that a plaintiff is
not limited in the procedural remedies available to it.
.

f/

"When a debtor is in default under a
security agreement, a secured party has
the rights and remedies provided in
this part. . . .
He may reduce his
claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise
enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure." (Emphasis added.)

:.•;...-•<.<• Defendants Tucker are apparently arguing that where
Plaintiff has been granted a money judgment for a sum certain,
it cannot foreclose on the collateral but must proceed to
execute on the property of the Defendants by some sort of
distinct procedure.

Official Comment 6 to the Uniform Com-

mercial Code §9-501 indicates that a plaintiff may choose
either to foreclose or to execute following judgment.

"A judi-

cial sale following judgment, execution and levy is one of
the methods of foreclosure contemplated by §§1. . . . "
Under the relevant Utah statutory provisions, then,
Plaintiff was fully entitled to a personal money judgment
against the Defendants Tucker and was also entitled to execute
on the stock held in the custody of the court.
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. • The Defendants Tucker have arcrued tnat in-.s r< carmen t
could ,:ot act as a personal judgment against them s .iicv *.hc
i.. ^oiucl ov; prevented H;"r<^n

"•;• -

LiaDiiiLy o: the Defendants."

-v:<w_
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>;

> Mu^

Appell.ii.Ls' rtii^f, -.)

-ell
'r ; . •

certainly not the case,
The trial co- i • >";- it i\
certain (R.102).

^ v.r--c

The manter oi attorney fees n\. i:;r

judgment, and. if attorney fees

ire i; It irately

v.-i 11 o.-nsi li'Jte a separate judgment.
\ i.r)4"} .

run^i'v :

•; •

•-; ^..*-

iwardoa, thtv

, . - . . Judgments §>4zz

The judgment aiLowed Plaintiff to place a • ien on ; i i i.
•aopoiiy *' ' iii- ;^.''t'\.di: t-

' : ••*• r

.

' e :::oi inty

and further aJ lowed the Plaintiff u.> ::;e:.l the stock held by
the court.

The court's order did not require Plaintiff to seJ1

• i1'* .^'L •;-C"u ;•* Joi«- <*i:;i \\- i .u i I L ^ ^ ' H - < < - :, but merely allowed
Plainti:f to execute on \ lie .-Lock KS though it: were held "by
the Defendants themselves.

bui-t *5n ov"d< r was necessary in view

of the fact that the stock was held by the court and a court
order was required to release it.
C.

The creation of a lien fay the trial court's
judgment is not a proper subject for appeal
since the trial court had no authority to
"create" a lien, nor does the record indicate that it did so, and this court cannot
review a matter that was never before the
trial court."
The trial court's amended order granting summary judg-

ment was absolutely proper in holding the Defendants Tucker liable
on the note amount and in R!lowing the Plaintiff to execute on
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the stock held as security, which stock had been deposited
with the court prior to the court's final order on this matter
(R.131, 131A).

Defendants Tucker have presented no evidence

whatsoever in the record that the trial court's judgment is
acting as a lien on the Defendant's real estate "in Utah
County, Carbon County, Duchesne County, Sanpete County (and
Davis County) and perhaps in other counties. . . . "

(Appellants'

Brief, 6 ) . It is the law in the State of Utah and in other
jurisdictions that a judgment does not create a lien and if
a party is objecting to a lien he must show evidence thereof.
In Orton v. Adams, 21 Ut.2d 245, 444 P.2d 62 (1968), the court
stated:
"Thus, it is seen that it is not the judgment but the docketing thereof which creates
the lien. Over 2000 acres of the land in
question are not in the county where the judgment was rendered. The record does not show
that a transcript of the judgment was ever
filed in the office of the clerk of the
district court in the county where the land
lies." Id. 63-4.
Defendants Tucker's objection to the alleged docketing of the judgment in outlying counties is not supported by
the record.

In the absence of any part of the record evidencing

a docketing of the judgment in outlying counties, this court
has but one alternative and that is described at 4A C.J.S.,
Appeal and Error, §1203(a).
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"The court on appeal will not consider
questions arising after judgment unless
properly raised and supported by a
record sufficient to enable the court
to determine whether error has been
committed."
The Defendants Tucker state that they are fearful
that title companies will slander their title and that the
judgment will be docketed in outlying counties.

There is

no proof of this before the court except the acknowledged
fears of the Defendants Tucker.

Were these fears based on

more concrete evidence, we could better sympathize with
their position.

However, as it is stated in 4A C.J.S.,

Appeal and Error, §12 06, "The appellate court can only take
the record as it finds it and cannot. . .consider matters
which lie in the imagination or apprehension of court or
counsel."
In addition to being concerned about the possibly
slanderous future activities of title companies (Appellants'
Brief, 15), Defendants Tucker are also apprehensive that prospective purchasers may be dissuaded from buying by virtue
of any purported liens on their property (Appellants' Brief,
supra).

However, it is stated at 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error,

§1324(2), 388 (1958):

"The probable effect of a judgment on

third parties is not a legitimate basis for an argument
addressed to an appellate tribunal."

See also 5 C.J.S.,

Appeal and Error, §1497(d).
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If the Defendants Tucker have an objection to the
docketing of the judgment, they must present evidence to the
court that the judgment was indeed docketed in outlying counties.
Further, they should not attack the judgment itself, which
creates no lien, but rather they should object to the county
clerk's office in those outlying counties where they allege
the judgment is docketed or to the title companies who they
insist will slander the title or to the prospective purchasers
who breach their sales contracts with Defendants.
There has been no evidence before the trial court
or before this court in the record on appeal that the judgment
in question was ever docketed in outlying counties.

Neither

can the District Court of Salt Lake County be responsible for
whatever interpretations title companies and prospective purchasers may choose to place on a judgment so docketed.

This

matter is both unsubstantiated and inappropriate for appellate
review.
CONCLUSION
The court in the present case was faced with an
unusual situation where the court itself held possession of
the collateral on a secured transaction.

The court entered

judgment in a sum certain on the promissory note and allowed
the Plaintiff to execute on the stock held b y the court.
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trial court's order was completely appropriate to the
circumstances of this case, and the court's judgment is
supported fully by Utah statutory law and case authority.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Kay M. Lewis
JENSEN & LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
320 South 300 East, Suite 1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the
foregoing Respondent's Brief to Arthur H. Nielsen and David
S. Cook, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants Tucker, 200 North
Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

/

1976, postage prepaid.
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